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Abstract The paper takes issue with the mainstream economic analysis of the enor-
mous flow of silver into China in 1550–1820. First, I challenge the view that arbitrage
between gold and silver in European trade with China was important except for one
twenty-year spell. Next, I argue that had China imported gold, its history would have
been much the same. I also dispute the idea that the persistence of the silver inflows
from 1550 to 1820 implies any persistent disequilibrium, and I maintain that economic
theory can easily accommodate the view that the inflow of silver into China sponsored
growth in China.
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In these pages, I would like to express some doubts about the mainstream analysis of
the enormous flow of silver to China in 1550–1820. These doubts will cover four
separate topics: the importance of arbitrage between gold and silver; the inflow of silver
rather than gold; the persistence of the silver inflow over centuries; and the effect of the
inflow of silver on China itself.
On the first topic, the literature maintains that arbitrage between gold and silver is
essential in explaining the inflow of silver into China. But the argument is thin. There is
no question that the differences in the relative prices of gold and silver between China
and the rest of the world played a critical part in explaining why silver continually
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flowed in rather than gold. However, this does not mean that trade between the two
metals mattered or even took place. The importance of arbitrage between the two is a
separate empirical question. Indeed, the exaggerated role of arbitrage in discussing
China assumes unusual proportions. Two of the most prominent contributors to the
discussion, Flynn and Giràldez (2002), even go so far as to describe the two periods
within the 1550–1820 stretch when the silver/gold ratios between China and the rest of
the world became equal (once around 1640 and another around 1750) as two excep-
tional times of equilibrium between the stock and the demand for silver in China. They
are nothing of the sort but simply times when arbitrage between the two metals could
be ruled out as a factor in explaining the inflow of silver into China.
This basic point is easily explained at once. In case of profitable trade in third goods,
silver will flow into the countries where the metal is relativelymore valued than gold and
gold will flow into the countries where it is relatively more valued than silver. However,
these flows do not imply the profitability of trade between the two metals. This next
profitability depends very significantly on the costs of transport, risks, insurance,
political interferences such as tariffs, etc., associated with trade between the two metals,
as well as on the differential in price between the two. Let us label all of the costs
inhibiting arbitrage, transaction costs. Then persistently low international spreads be-
tween the price ratios of the two metals probably mean low transaction costs of two-way
trade between them; persistently high spreads probably mean high transaction costs. If
the spreads tend to narrow and subsequently to remain low, it is a good bet that arbitrage
between the two metals plays a role. However, the spreads of themselves tell us little or
nothing about the profitability of trade of either metal with third goods and therefore
about the volume of inflow of either metal. Zero spreads do not spell equilibrium in any
sense at all. Under this condition the world distribution of the two precious metals could
continue to move in any direction because of the profitability of trade in third goods
(with either metal serving to pay as their relative prices are the same). All we know is
that arbitrage between the two metals would be unprofitable.
Secondly, the literature places enormous emphasis on the strict silver content of the
inflow of precious metals. But had it been gold that flowed in instead or had it been a
mix of the two, would Chinese history have differed significantly and why? Interest-
ingly enough, in the mid-eighteenth century Hume posed the very same question for
England: What difference would it make for the country if the composition of the
inflow of gold and silver changed? His answer was that it would make no difference at
all; all that counts is the aggregate inflow of money (Hume, BOf interest^ [1752] in
Rotwein (1970), ed., pp. 47–48). I will argue likewise for China that had gold flowed in
rather than silver, Chinese history would have been much the same. Regardless of gold
or silver, there would have been the same inadequate production of the metal at home,
since the country was not a significant producer of either metal. Thus there would have
been much the same need to produce silk, porcelain and tea in order to pay for the
metal. Any clear difference from China’s adherence to silver rather than gold as money
comes after the study period, post-1870, when China became increasingly isolated as a
money-user of silver, and with few and small exceptions other countries (including
India by the beginning of the twentieth century) switched from silver or bimetallism to
the gold standard in a world of rising international mobility of capital.
Third, there is a tendency in the discussion to view the Chinese data as implying
long and persistent periods of excess demand for silver in China. However, this
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interpretation is problematic. It implies a long run tendency for the value of the metal to
rise relative to other goods or a long period of deflation in terms of silver. Yet according
to the usual measures, the consumer price level rose moderately in 1550–1700 and
more than doubled in 1700–1800. As an alternative, I will argue that the data is
consistent with long run equilibrium over 1550–1820 as a whole with deviations, of
varying lengths, positive and negative, and a fundamental regime change around 1700,
when the Xing, now in complete control of the political situation after the fall of the
Ming dynasty in 1644, not only fully accepted silver as money, which the Ming never
did, but also adopted an expansionary monetary policy as regards bronze coins. This
alternative view seems at least as reasonable as the frequent one of a continuous
disequilibrium in one direction.
Fourth and last, I will express doubts about the important tendency in the
literature about Chinese imports of silver to minimize the impact of the imports
on China. This tendency represents, I believe, an overreaction to the earlier
Eurocentric view emphasizing the influence of Europe on the Far East. The
overreaction takes two forms. One is to argue that China was simply too big for
the inflows to matter much, especially if we consider strictly the inflows coming
from Europe or its possessions in the New World (Goldstone 1991, pp. 371–2, is
an example). Atwell (2005, pp. 469-470) has already responded well to this claim
by pointing (largely with quotes from others) to the possibility that large concen-
trated effects on a small region of a big country would lead to broad changes in
the rest of the country, in analogy to the way that any seed can spread (compare
Marks 1997, pp. 129–30). However, a second part of the overreaction has gone
unanswered. This part relies on the tradition since Hume, Smith and Ricardo to
consider monetary events as bearing a strict influence on nominal events rather
than real performance (Chaudhury 1978, pp. 156–9, was perhaps the first to
suggest the point). It is indeed the case that this tradition says that in the long
run, after all adjustments take place, the inflows of silver into China can only
explain levels of money prices in the country. Thus, this tradition does indeed
imply no impact of the inflow of silver into China on real economic performance,
or in long run output, population, and living standards. However, though vener-
able, the tradition is also a very incomplete guide to what economics says about
the question.1
Generally, monetary analysis recognizes but does not explore in any depth the
historical margin from barter to money exchange; instead it centers on the monetized
sector. The wholesale concentration on this sector holds for the Hume-Ricardo-Mill
specie-flow mechanism, the Fisher and Cambridge versions of the quantity theory of
money, and the monetary approach to the balance of payments, all of which receive
great attention from economic historians. But the benefits of money exchange as
opposed to barter have a long history in economics too and they tend to pop up readily
in the introductory parts of elementary textbooks. Yet unfortunately these aspects of the
topic have never been well integrated into the main corpus of monetary analysis. In
these parts of the economic discussion, monetization is not just a matter of higher
demand for money, but also one of reduced transaction and information costs, whose
1 There are also passages in Hume and Smith, especially Hume, which contradict the tradition, as I will show
in note 21.
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effect on real economic activity, if anything, is often exaggerated by conjuring ahistor-
ical situations where barter is almost unbelievably costly.2 On any close reading of
Chinese monetary history, those sections of the economic literature are highly relevant.
1 Arbitrage
Something of the order of 80–85% of world production of silver in 1550–1800 came
from the New World (Barrett 1990, Table 7, p. 225). Chaunu (1960, pp. 268-9)
estimated that somewhat over one-third of the silver from the New World ended up
in the BExtreme Orient,^ which means predominantly to China. That could make as
much as around 27% of world output going to China altogether. That is an enormous
percentage. According to the literature, arbitrage between gold and silver played a vital
role in explaining this impressive phenomenon. Consider, for example, the following
quotation from Richard von Glahn (2003, p. 197), perhaps the most widely cited expert
on Chinese monetary history:
The gross disparity between the price of silver (measured in gold) in China and
on the international market had been the source of the enormous arbitrage profits
that was the impetus behind the massive drain of New World and Japanese silver
in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. [A footnote reference to Flynn 1986
follows.]…. But the centuries-old disparity in silver/gold ratios came to an end in
the middle of the eighteenth century. The price of silver (measured in gold) at
Canton sank from 138 percent of the international price in the 1730s to 97 percent
in the 1750s, and remained roughly at par throughout the rest of the century. The
parity between silver/gold exchange ratios in China and in the international
market lends further support to the conclusion that supply and demand for silver
in China were in stable equilibrium.
In the same vein, Flynn and Giràldez (2002, p. 395) describe the convergence of silver/
gold exchange ratios in China and the rest of the world around 1640 as meaning that
Bglobal shipments of silver were no longer motivated strictly by arbitrage
considerations.^
These are most curious statements.
Take any two countries, A and B, say, China and BEurope^. From first principles, we
know that if transactions costs of moving gold and silver between them are negligible,
arbitrage will cause the silver/gold exchange ratios in the two to be little apart and to
move together. If instead the transaction costs are non-negligible, arbitrage will set an
upper and a lower bound to the difference between the two ratios. If the difference
between the two falls outside the two bounds, arbitrage will tend to bring the ratios to
the bounds. If the difference falls inside the bounds, arbitrage will be unprofitable and
absent. On this basis, we can make two basic inferences. First, if the ratios of the two
relative prices move in close harmony over time, arbitrage is very likely to operate
since otherwise the result would be highly improbable, especially if the difference
2 Indeed, mocking the exaggerated treatment of the costs of barter in economics has been a prominent sport of
some anthropologists. An outstanding recent example is Graeber (2011, pp. 21-45).
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between the two is small. Second, if the two ratios move along separate paths, it is
highly likely that transaction costs are large and we are mostly inside the bounds, where
other factors than arbitrage explain the metallic flows.
Is there anything more we can say? In particular, can we say anything about the sign
of the movements and the volumes? Indeed, we can make a strong prediction about the
sign but can say little about the volumes. The sign should follow from the difference in
relative prices. Suppose that the silver/gold exchange rate is lower in China than in
Europe (less silver per unit of gold). Next, let us suppose that the export of any third
good from China in return for silver is profitable to both China and Europe. Then
whether or not the export of this third good in return for gold is also profitable to both,
the sale for silver must be more profitable and will dominate. Therefore, silver will flow
from Europe into China in preference to gold, no matter how wide or narrow the bands
between the silver/gold price ratios are (never mind the slight bias in favor of shipping
gold because it is the more valuable of the two metals and the less costly to transport). It
follows that the difference between the two exchange ratios tells us nothing about the
volume of the flow of silver from Europe into China but only about the sign. What
about the possible impact of a movement in the difference in the exchange ratios
between China and Europe? Suppose that the silver/gold exchange ratio rises in China
relative to Europe, shouldn’t the flow of silver into China fall? Indeed, it should, that is,
if there is any arbitrage in the first place and if, in addition, it is the only or the dominant
influence on the silver flow. Otherwise, if arbitrage is absent or there are many other
influences besides it, some of similar or greater weight, then this is not the case.
Next, let us turn to the facts. Figure 1 juxtaposes estimates of annual silver inflows
into China from the two main sources, Europe and Japan, at the top with values of
silver/gold exchange ratios for China, Europe and Japan at the bottom for 1550–1820.
(Unfortunately, the information about the exchange ratios for Japan, from Yamamura
and Kamiki (1983), only goes from 1550 to 1639.) The reason for the end date of 1820
is that the flow of silver finally turned into an outflow at about that time.3 1550–1820
therefore marks a period of uninterrupted accumulation of silver from abroad in China.
The data for the silver inflows comes from von Glahn (1996a, 2003) up to 1700 and
from Yamamura and Kamiki (1983) beyond. These figures include strictly inflows of
silver from production in Latin America or Japan. Like von Glahn and Yamamura and
Kamiki, I treat all imports from Latin America, whether they arrive directly across the
Pacific or indirectly via the Atlantic, as coming from Europe. For the silver/gold
exchange ratios, the source is Peng (1993–4) for China and it is Soetbeer (1879) for
Europe. Von Glahn (1996a) used Spooner’s (1956, p. 339) data for France rather than
Soetbeer’s for Germany as a measure of the European silver/gold exchange ratios. But I
prefer Soetbeer’s data because it covers the entire study period while Spooner’s data
does not. Further, the two series are virtually identical over the years where they
coincide. The notes to Fig. 1 contain more detail and the Appendix offers the exact
numbers, going back to the fifteenth century and forward to 1850 in some cases.
As regards the silver/gold exchange rates, the series for China and Europe have been
the focus of attention heretofore. If we judge from first principles alone, we can see from
3 The outflow of silver in the 1820s came from two principal factors: opium imports and a political crisis in
Mexico stemming the inflow of the silver Carolus peso coins into China, then-popular in China (Ma 2012 and
von Glahn 2013, pp. 52–53).
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the bottom of Fig. 1 that over 1750–1820, or at the end of the period, arbitrage between
gold and silver between Europe and China is much in evidence. Beginning in 1750, the
two ratios drew close together and subsequently moved in tandem. (See Deng 2008, p.
329, for evidence that this continued for the rest of the nineteenth century.) However, up to
(b) SILVER/GOLD EXCHANGE RATIOS 1550-1820
(a) ESTIMATED IMPORTS OF SILVER INTO CHINA 1550-1820
(Annual values in metric tons)
Fig. 1 Note: The estimated imports of silver from Europe into China come, respectively, from von Glahn
(1996a), Table 13, p. 140, for 1550–1600; same source, Table 23, p. 232, for 1601–1700; von Glahn (2003),
Table 9.2, p. 195, for 1701–1806; and Dermigny (1964, II, p. 735) (von Glahn’s source for 1701–1806) for
1807–1820. Those from Japan come from van Glahn (1996a), same tables as those for Europe for 1550–1700,
and from Yamamura and Kamiki (1983), Table 7, p. 344 for 1701–1820. The silver/gold exchange rates for
China come from Peng (1993–94), p. 608 for 1550–1635, p. 768 for 1650–1700, p. 767 for 1701–1800, and p.
768 for 1801–20. These exchange rates also include one observation from Yamamura and Kamiki (1983),
Table 9, p. 345: the one for 1637–1640. The silver/gold exchange rate for Germany, standing for Europe, all
come from Soetbeer (1879), p. 123 for 1550–1680, and pp. 129–30 for 1681–1820. The silver/gold exchange
ratios for Japan come from Yamamura and Kamiki (1983), Table 10, p. 346, except for 1630–39, which comes
from Kobata (1965), p. 254. The Appendix contains the original data. It brings in more data and offers more
detail about the estimated imports
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1750, the graphs would mainly suggest instead wide bands between the arbitrage points of
at least 50%most of the time. Perhaps arbitrage played a role in explaining why the bands
were no wider. But even this need not be the case. The exchange rates could have been
always within the upper and lower bounds for profitable arbitrage, while separate forces
acted upon the two rates. The 1600–1650 period is particularly interesting, since prima
facie it gives the impression of no significant arbitrage between China and Europe, as we
can hardly imagine that the arbitrage points between the two would have shrunk to
virtually nothing from 1600 to 1640 only to return to their previous level in 1650. (We
will come back to this time stretch shortly.) Next, let us look at the top of Fig. 1 as well.
The top traces the inflow of silver from Europe alone (via Latin America) and from both
Europe and Japan (the larger of the two sources until 1685) together into China. It is plain
at a glance that a higher positive percentage difference in the exchange rate in Europe (+)
over the one in China (−) (greater arbitrage opportunities of moving silver to China and
gold the opposite way) had no positive association with inflows of silver into China,
neither from Europe nor from Europe and Japan combined. In fact, the correlation seems
to go the other way: more profitable arbitrage opportunities seem to be associated with
lower inflows of silver into China. Indeed, the statistical correlation between the arbitrage
opportunities (the ratio of the European rate minus the Chinese rate to the Chinese rate)
and the flow of silver into China is strongly negative. The coefficient is −0.65 for flows
coming from Europe and − 0.47 for the total inflows (from Europe and Japan combined)
in 1550 to 1820. If we prefer to focus on the period of 1600 to 1750 (because the gross
profit rates from arbitrage are all near-zero from 1750 to 1820 and there is a single
observation for inflows from 1550 to 1600), the two respective coefficients become −0.27
and − 0.61. Those results are also highly robust.4 This opposite relation clearly calls to
mind the possibility of a negative supply effect of large inflows of silver into China on the
price of silver relative to gold in the country (higher ratios of silver to gold) rather than
anything to do with arbitrage.5 In conclusion, the raw data yields no evidence of arbitrage
between gold and silver before 1750. The only way to find out anything about the subject
in the earlier years, 1550–1750, is to examine the evidence further.
As a preliminary, note that arbitrage would require gold outflows from China
corresponding to the silver inflows. Even such outflows, though, would not necessarily
spell arbitrage. For example, the gold could go out from China to Europe in payment
for woolens while the silver came in from Europe to pay for silk, without any arbitrage
ever taking place between the metals. In this respect, we are lucky, however, since the
Chinese hardly imported anything but silver from either Europe or Japan during the
period (though it did import significant values of other goods from Southeast Asia and
from Russia). Therefore, we can interpret any gold outflows from China toward Europe
or Japan as reflecting arbitrage between gold and silver.
Flynn and Giràldez consistently emphasize arbitrage between the two metals be-
tween China and Europe in 1580–1640 in their many discussions of the subject (for
4 The calculations rest on the values of the two variables at equally spaced intervals (every 5–6 years), whose
number matches the number of observation points for silver/gold exchange rates that served in constructing the
graphs from the data (in the Appendix, Table 2). However, raising or lowering the number of observations in
the calculation within a reasonable range (2- to 10-year intervals) yields essentially the same results.
5 Of course, any inflows of silver into China stemming from profitable arbitrage would also lower the price of
silver in the country (raise the silver/gold rate in China), but that would only limit the positive impact of the
profitable arbitrage on the inflows rather than reverse the signs.
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example, Flynn and Giràldez 1994, pp. 74–76, Flynn and Giràldez 1995a, p. 432,
Flynn and Giràldez 1996a, p. 313, Flynn and Giràldez 1997, pp. XVI-XVII, and Flynn
and Giràldez 2002, pp. 396–398). Nonetheless, to the best of my abilities to determine,
there were no important European imports of Chinese gold in this period (which saw
large European imports of gold and silver from the Peruvian and Mexican mines
instead (Vilar 1974, p. 179)). The only important sale of gold in return for silver by
China during this time was in trade with Japan and India, not Europe (see, for example,
Kobata 1965 and Yamamura and Kamiki 1983 for Japan, and Souza 1986, p. 54, for
India).6 Things differ for 1650–1750, when Chinese gold evidently flowed out to
Europe fairly regularly. However, this flow remained fairly insignificant until the
second half of the period, 1700–1750 and only became large and important around
1720–1740 (see Dermigny 1964, vol. 2, pp. 407–433).7 Thus, if I am correct, the period
of 1700–1750, perhaps more exactly 1720–1740, is the only one in the whole 1550–
1750 interval when arbitrage between Europe and China was important.
The 1580–1640 experience is of particular interest because at its close, in the early
1640s (perhaps as early as 1637), the silver/gold ratios in China and Europe drew
together for the very first time since 1550. However, as I have already intimated and
will now try to show, this was sheer accident.8 The fundamental forces driving the
Chinese exchange rate at the time were in the Far East.
In the first place, the equation of the two ratios in the early 1640s was an event of
short duration, soon reversed. The European ratio had remained fairly still near 14 to 1
during the 1620–1640 interval and remained in the 14/15 range for the rest of the
century (see Fig. 1). The Chinese ratio is the one that moved. It had been around 8 or 10
to 1 in the 1620s. It then rose to 13 to 1 in the late 30s or early 40s, thus attaining the
then-current level of 13.13 to 1 in the Spanish Empire (Cross 1983, p. 400, and Atwell
1982, p. 82). Next, however, the Chinese ratio fell right back to 10 to 1 in relatively
short time, where it stayed for the rest of the seventeenth century. Von Glahn (1996b, p.
433) refers to the equation of the two ratios as Bshort-lived^; De Vries (2003, p. 95)
describes it as Bbrief^.9 On the face of it, something may well have happened in and
6 This is not to deny that some Chinese gold went to Europe in 1580–1640. The question is whether this gold
ever amounted to much. Kobata (1965, p. 247) refers to such gold movement (p. 247), and Souza (1986) can
be interpreted this way (p. 5) but both authors’ emphasis is on movements of Chinese gold to other
destinations in Asia. On the other hand, Attman (1981) never mentions any flow of Chinese gold to Europe
in a book-length study of the flow of bullion between Europe and the East. Nor does Chuan (1997) in a
summary treatment of trade between China and Europe. Nor do Yamamura and Kamiki (1983) in an
important, much-cited piece where such flows would have been expected to appear if they mattered. Nor
does von Glahn, not explicitly, though he does emphasize gold flows from China to both Japan and India
(primarily Japan) in several places (von Glahn 1996a, pp. 129–30, 1996b, pp. 434–5, 2013, p. 36). For all of
their own fuss about arbitrage, Flynn and Giráldez (2002, p. 398, note 13) themselves do not even necessarily
disagree about the slight volumes in 1580–1640.
7 In the omitted section in the previous quotation from von Glahn (2003), indicated by ellipses, he refers to this
next incident and the evidence from Dermigny, as well the earlier incident (which he mentions with less
precision).
8 This would also not be first time that such an accident happened. Peng (1993–4, p. 765) observes that at
several junctures, Bgold-silver ratios of both sides [China and Europe] had converged during Song and Yuan
times.^ However, he considers these convergences coincidences and independent of any arbitrage (next
paragraph; see also p. 433).
9 Yang (1952, p. 48) cites a ratio of silver/gold for China of 10 to one in 1662, and Peng (1993–4, p. 768)
proposes an average ratio of 10 to 1 for the entire half century 1650–1700. Yet I have never seen any actual
price quotations for the late 1640s and 1650s.
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around China independently of Europe. In fact, Kobata (1965) and Yamamura and
Kamiki (1983) confirm this possibility. As Kobata points out, at the end of the sixteenth
century, silver/gold exchange rates in the Philippines, Sumatra, Siam and Indo-China in
Southeast Asia were below the Chinese level. He quotes a ratio of 6 to 1 for northern
Sumatra in 1610 (p. 255) as opposed to around 8 to 1 for China. The Japanese one at
the time was around 11 to 1 (Yamamura and Kamiki 1983, p. 346). Then in the
following years, through trade, including no doubt significant arbitrage, the exchange
ratios in Southeast Asia, China and Japan converged and attained about 13 to 1 by 1640
for two reasons, both centered on Japan. One was the considerable increase in the
supply of silver from Japanese mines that resulted from the important discoveries of
new deposits of the metal in the country dating back to the 1530s and the subsequent
adoption of improved technology for separating the silver from lesser minerals. The
other was that the rulers in Japan in the 1580s and in the first half of the sixteenth
century decided to favor mining, even by exporting silver for other goods (compare
Atwell 1982, pp. 68–72). Under these two influences, silver depreciated heavily in the
whole region relative to gold. In the 1630s, Japan became an exporter of gold
(Yamamura and Kamiki 1983, p. 350); thus the arbitrage between China and Japan
ceased. The relevant trade, including the arbitrage while it lasted, consisted of the
export of silver by Japan to China and Southeast Asia in return for purchases of gold
and silk (mainly silk) from China and spices, sugar, silk and a range of other products
from Southeast Asia. The trade was also carried largely, but by no means exclusively,
by Portuguese ships. Very significantly, however, once Japan ceased to buy Chinese
gold, the Chinese silver/gold exchange rate went right back from 13 to 1 to 10 to 1
levels in relatively short time. It is difficult to see what bearing the temporary merging
of the Chinese rate with the European one has on all this.
As an interesting sidelight, India also became an important destination for Chinese
gold in the 1620s along with Japan. In that decade, the silver/gold exchange ratio rose
in India from around 10/1 to the 12/1 to 14/1 range (Moosvi 1987, p.65) whereas the
ratio remained in the 8 to 10 range in China. Consequently, some Chinese gold in the
Southeast Asian trade headed for India instead of Japan, and this trade continued into
the 1630s, when Japan had ceased to be a destination for any Chinese gold. Souza
(1986, p. 54) provides convincing evidence of the importance of the movement of
Chinese gold to India (another reputed Bsink^ for the world output of both gold and
silver) in this interval. However, to all indication, this trade also ceased in the 1640s.
As regards the years 1650–1750, we may begin with the following two quotes (same
page) from Peng (Peng 1993–4, p. 766):
During the last half of the seventeenth century, an ounce of gold cost 15 ounces of
silver in Europe, but still only 10 in China. Once the European merchants who
had come to China had taken care to acquire the goods they had come for, they
would use the remainder of their money for Chinese gold jewelry, which made an
excellent investment.
During the first century or so of Qing [thus approximately 1650-1750], there were
few European merchant vessels which came to China without buying gold there,
particularly with the private funds of the ships’ officers. The East India Company
regulated the goods that ships officers might carry.… They were only permitted
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to bring gold and musk back from China because the space occupied by those
articles was not great.
From these observations, we get the strong impression that arbitrage of the two metals
between China and Europe from 1650 to 1700, while it existed, was not a primary
objective. However, as regards 1700–1750, the story changes, mainly for 1720–1740.
There is plain evidence (largely from Dermigny 1964, vol. 2) of European ships sailing
out to the Far East with the express purpose of bringing back Chinese gold as a major
part of the return cargo. Since the differences in the ratios of silver/gold prices in 1720
were still much the same as they had been since 1650, the arbitrage points must have
narrowed. The impression of such narrowing is reinforced by the fact that the differ-
ences in the exchange ratios continued shrinking after 1720, especially from 1740
onward, and after 1750, the ratios remained closely tied together, never to widen again,
for the rest of the period.
The basic point, I believe, is that even a 50% difference between silver/gold
exchange rates did not necessarily suffice to promote significant arbitrage. It is also
not difficult to see why. De Vries (2003, p. 89) cites observed ratios of revenues to costs
on imports from China, or ratios of sales price in Europe to purchase price in Asia,
going from 3.4 to 1 in 1600 to 2.4 to 1 in 1750 for the European trading companies
plying the Cape route to Asia as a group (Table 2.13). Chaudhury (1986, p.76) cites
similar ratios of 2 to 4 to 1 on all imports from Asia to Europe for the English East India
Company (EIC) in the first half of the eighteenth century. Yet, because of associated
costs, even these enormous mark-ups only led to rates of return on capital of around
20%, that is, on successful operations. According to Chaudhury (1978, p. 440), the
annual profit rates of the East India Company for 1710 through 1745 peak at 22.2%.
Based on Chaudhury’s data, De Vries calculates average rates of 12.5% in the 1710s
and 5.7% in 1736–1745 (p. 91).10 One passage in Dermigny (1964, vol. 2, pp. 424-
425) is exceptionally to the point. There he focuses on ships carrying back gold from
Canton to London between 1729 and 1741. For a sample of 16 vessels, he reports an
average gross margin of 30% on imported gold (which would be consistent with silver/
gold exchange rates between 11 and 12 to 1 in China while they were 15 to 1 in
Europe) and almost 150% for the rest of the merchandise, that is, 5 times higher. He
does not report rates of profit. But it is quite clear from his discussion that as the price of
gold rose relative to silver in China in the 1740s, which it did, the gold imports would
be the ones to go first, not the rest. Two other pieces of evidence may be cited.
The EIC had evidently considered importing gold from China in the 1670s as it was
importing the metal from other parts of the East. But the company decided against it
because, as Chaudhury explains (Chaudhury 1978, p. 181): BThe duration of the
10 The downward trend in the profit rate that De Vries singles out could be very important. In a more recent
publication (De Vries 2010, pp. 722–726), he emphasizes increasing competition between the trading
companies in the early decades of the eighteenth century as a factor. He also presents a more detailed range
of ratios of sales to costs for 1700–1750 than he had earlier in 2003, going from 2.75 to 1.76. This downward
trend in gross margins might help to understand why gold became progressively more competitive with other
Chinese goods as a European import over the period. To explain, suppose that ship cargoes had been optimally
composed in 1700, so that changing the composition in any way would bring down total profits. Then as gross
returns on everything but gold fell, at some point the marginal return of including gold in the return cargo at
the expense of something else would make it profitable to do so, even if the differential in the silver-gold
exchange rate between Europe and China was unchanged.
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voyage from Europe to China and back was too long to permit a substantial margin of
profit.^ He also quotes concordant opinion of contemporary EIC management dating as
late as 1698. As the other piece of evidence, von Glahn (1996a) explains that much
earlier, in 1609, when there were significant opportunities for profitable arbitrage of
gold for silver between China and Japan, a Spanish official wrote that Bif this [Chinese
gold] was brought to New Spain, or to Castile, a profit of 75 or 80 percent would be
made^ (p. 130). However, von Glahn observes in passing that the plan Bapparently did
not win converts in Madrid^ (p.131).
The point is clear. Space on ships is scarce. Carrying gold is at the expense of
carrying something else. The revenues on any return voyage must cover all of the costs
of administration, fixed capital, labor, security and risks at sea (or land), for the required
time (at least 18 months and possibly two years) and none of these costs can be
assigned to any single transported good but must still be met for the entire operation
to be profitable. Therefore, even a 75–80% gross margin on gold, to say nothing of a
50% one might not suffice. In sum, the big stimulus for Chinese-European trade was
silk for silver.11 The lure of arbitrage between gold and silver was a modest factor
before 1700 or 1720. Matters evidently changed in the 1750s when arbitrage started to
keep the silver-gold exchange rates between China and Europe from spreading apart on
a continuous basis. Perhaps it became easier to exchange claims on silver and gold
between Europe and China without physical movement of the metals. This has never
been properly explained.
2 Silver Versus Gold
Next, I wish to call into question the importance that the literature accords to the
Chinese import of silver rather than gold. There is an associated tendency to underline
the contemporaneous European view of the Chinese in 1600–1640 as a people with an
extraordinary thirst for silver. Some of the quotations are admittedly irresistible.
According to one Portuguese missionary writing around 1637–1638 (Boxer 1970, p.
463) the Chinese merchants’ attitude toward silver in Manila can be described as
BSilver is blood.^ A Portuguese former colonial administrator writing around 1609
reports that the Chinese merchants in Manila would only accept silver in trade: BFor
they do not like gold, nor any other goods in exchange, nor do they carry any to China^
(for example, Atwell 1982, p. 76). Notable too, even though neutral about predilections
and tastes, is the analytical observation of a contemporary Portuguese merchant, dating
1621 (for example, von Glahn 1996c, p. 433): BSilver wanders throughout all the world
in its peregrinations before flocking to China, where it remains as if at its natural
center.^ But in interpreting all such statements, it is fundamental to keep in mind that
the exchange rates favored importing silver to gold in China at the time. The Chinese
11 Silk was a good of similarly high value relative to weight (and occupied space), and Ma (1999, p.61) cites
10 to 1 gross margins on silk travelling from Manila to Peru around 1620–21 in a broad historical study of the
silk trade going far back to antiquity. However, Flynn and Giráldez (1995a, p. 434, 2002, p. 401, n.19) dispute
such high ratios and consider 3 to 1 ratios far more likely. For a wealth of interesting information from many
sources about the importance of trade of silk for silver in the seventeenth century, see Flynn and Giráldez
(1996b).
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merchants could have been avid profit-seekers. Is there more to the matter? The
evidence does not support it.
Even as recently as the early mid-sixteenth century, the silver/gold ratios between
China and Japan had favored the import of gold and the export of silver in China in
trade between the two countries for many decades. That is exactly what happened
(Kobata 1965, p. 348, Yamamura and Kamiki 1983, pp. 329–342). Going back many
centuries earlier in Chinese history, gold and silver emerged as monetary metals around
200 and 120 B.C., respectively (Peng 1993–4, pp. 102, 106, 144). But Peng observes
(p. 359): BPrior to Song, gold had been more important than silver in China.^ Thus, for
much of the 11 centuries following the unification of China in 221 B.C., gold had been
the preferred of the two metals. Judging from the detailed discussion by von Glahn
(1996a and 2013), the subsequent ascendance of silver over gold seems to be a case of
path dependence. In Song times, China apparently acquired significant deposits of
silver at several mines, particularly in Fujian. Thus, when the Song decided to introduce
paper money around 1160 in order to economize on the transfer costs of metallic
payments, they chose silver rather than gold as reserve backing. Subsequently, the
Mongols accentuated this policy after coming to power in the thirteenth century.
However, at some point in the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty’s military effort to resist the
Ming, the dynasty began to over issue paper money (silver certificates of sorts), and
thereby caused silver to flow out of its coffers and the value of paper money to
evaporate. In the aftermath of the Yuan’s defeat in 1368, the Mings tried at first to
maintain or revive the paper money experiment in the last quarter of the fourteenth
century but failed. Subsequently, silver, not gold, provided the needed replacement for
the large denominations of paper money that had vanished via inflation and popular
disfavor. This happened despite efforts by the Ming dynasty to discourage the use of
silver ingots as money in order to retain control over the money stock consisting
otherwise of bronze coins. Eventually the Ming dynasty relented under the pressure
of commercial interests, and as of 1583, the Ming even required silver in payment for a
large part of taxes. All of this would seem to explain satisfactorily why silver spread
rather than gold as money without invoking any Chinese predilection for one metal
over the other, as is sometimes done.12
On the issue of the choice of metals, it is also important that gold could have served
the Chinese just as well as silver as money. This is all truer when we consider that in
either case they could have continued to use lesser metals for small change (to say
nothing of their ability to adulterate either metal). As is widely emphasized by the
experts in explaining the size of the inflow of silver into China in the relevant period
(Atwell 1982, p. 79, Flynn and Giràldez 2002, p. 407, and von Glahn 1996a), Chinese
population and output grew rapidly in the first couple of centuries of Ming rule. From
1450 to 1550, population went from 88 million to 146 million; by 1820, under the
Xing, it was 381 million. As a proportion of world population, the rise was from 23% in
1450 to 35% in 1820. In terms of output, Maddison estimates (2003, Table B-20, p.
12 The noted international economist Kindleberger (1989, p. 72) writes of a BChinese passion for silver^ and
comments that Bsilver was as addictive as opium^ (p. 69). For another example of this view, see Blitz (1967).
But the view does not represent the profession (as Kindleberger recognizes himself). For example, Chaudhuri
(1986, pp. 64–65) explicitly challenges all suggestion of any difference in mentality between Chinese and
European populations in explaining the two’s commercial behavior. Frank (1998) and Pomeranz (2000) take
the same view.
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263) that the share of Chinese to world GDP went from 25% in 1500 to 29.2% in 1600,
dropped to 22.3% in 1700, and went on to reach a staggering 32.9% in 1820. Judging
from those figures, it looks entirely reasonable that 27% of the world’s output of silver
would go to China in 1550–1820.
Of course, had China imported and monetized gold instead of silver, this would
have promoted the domestic mining of gold rather than silver. But there are no
striking differences in the country’s ability to produce either metal. In general,
China was not an important world producer of either one. Von Glahn (1996a, pp.
114-115) estimates that the country produced only as little as 10 to 15% of its
imports of silver on the average during the 16th and 17th centuries. To all
evidence, had China’s monetary demand been for gold instead of silver in
1550–1820, the country’s incentives to produce silk, porcelain and tea for export
would have been similar since it would still have needed to rely predominantly on
imports to meet its demand for money.13
The choice of gold or silver probably began to make a big difference sometime
after 1870. As seen, by 1750 silver/gold exchange ratios between Europe and
China had become nearly unified. From this time on, these ratios were essentially
determined jointly. This alone need not have made much difference since it simply
put China in the same position as it would have been had it used gold instead of
silver or a combination of both as money. However, two interrelated events in
1870–1900 made it very important. First, there was a widespread adoption of the
gold standard in the rest of the world. Second, the price of silver relative to gold
dropped to levels never seen before in recorded human world history. From
around 15 to 1 in 1870, the ratio went to 33 to 1 by 1900 (it is currently above
twice that level). This sharp rise in the relative price of gold worldwide meant a
rise in China’s import relative to its export prices in its commerce with countries
on gold. But as almost the entire rest of the world went on to the gold standard
progressively, by 1900 this rise in relative price pertained to virtually all of
China’s global trade (compare Wang 1992, p. 59).14 Accordingly, when the Great
Depression took hold after the Market Crash of 1929 and many countries devalued
their currency, China experienced a major appreciation of its currency at a time of
falling world aggregate demand for goods. And soon afterwards in the early
thirties, when the Western countries abandoned the gold standard and the US
even went so far as to raise the price of silver (in US dollars) with the Silver
Purchase Act of 1934, China experienced a big dive in its import prices and
catastrophic rise in net imports, which forced it to go off of silver in late 1934.
(See Friedman 1992 for some interesting discussion and further references.) But
this was all well after 1820, the end of our study period.
13 In one interesting section of his extensive monetary history of China, Peng (1993–4, pp. 764-770) asks what
difference it would have made for the purchasing power of money Bif, beginning with the Ming, China had
used gold instead of silver^ (p. 768). His answer is that the value of money would probably have been more
stable since gold prices were more stable than silver prices of rice during the time. This answer would seem to
reflect the view that there would have been no structural difference in fundamentals, like population, output,
and the profitability of trade, since otherwise Peng could not have drawn inferences from the observed price
data without adjusting the data in any way that is, not correctly.
14 For an econometric study of the responses of bilateral trade in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world to
the switch to the gold standard in 1870–1914, see Mitchener and Voth (2011).
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3 The Persistence of the Inflows
Interestingly, China continued accumulating silver from 1550 to 1820. De Vries (2003.
p. 96) offers the following explanation for this intriguing fact:
BThe silver required to monetize the economy [China’s] was enormous, and it
became a moving target as population growth accelerated after the mid-
seventeenth-century crisis. In the eighteenth century [my italics], China’s popu-
lation more than doubled (from 160 to 350 million).^
He adds (same page):
BThe Asian market was so large, and its monetized sectors were expanding… so
rapidly, that the establishment of an equilibrium with Europe was ever out of
reach.^
There can be no doubt that the size and growth of the Chinese economy contrib-
uted greatly to its heavy imports of silver starting in 1550. Yet the Chinese
population also shrunk from 160 million in 1600 to 123 million in 1650, a half
a century later (Maddison 1998, p. 169) and inflows of silver into China continued
nevertheless. Could it be simply, as De Vries suggests, that the supply of silver in
China in these years never caught up with the demand? The hole was too large to
fill. This idea of a major long-term excess demand for silver in China links up
with an important analytical point in Flynn (Flynn 1991, pp. 337–340) (see also
Flynn and Giràldez 1996a, p. 320). He observes that large annual flows of a
durable good like silver could constitute low percentages of the stock, whereas
market equilibrium requires satisfaction of the stock-demand. Therefore the in-
flows of silver could continue for a long time before filling the demand. This
could be especially pertinent concerning the imports of silver from Europe into
China since the latter was the much bigger of the two (and hence the inflows of
silver from Europe could be dwarfed by the desired stock). See Chaudhury 1986,
p. 76, for a laudatory appraisal of this argument.
Notwithstanding, the idea of a continuous excess demand for silver in the
period faces a basic problem: namely, it would imply continuous pressure toward
the appreciation of silver, or deflation of consumer prices in terms of silver.15 On
this ground alone, we can rule out the view altogether for the period of around
1680 or 1700 to 1820, when the opposite took place and prices rose significantly
15 As a matter of fact, Flynn himself adopts a different line of reasoning. According to him, there was a
continuous excess supply of silver in China as well as the rest of the world in 1550–1650 stemming from
profits in silver mining in Japan and the New World and the result was inflationary pressure everywhere.
Eventually the fall in the world price of silver removed profits in silver mining and brought the process to an
end (see Flynn 1986, pp. 42–47; 1991, pp. 337–340; and Flynn and Giràldez 1996a, p. 320). However, this
alternative view fits uncomfortably with the dominant theme in the literature (often in Flynn’s own writings,
with and without Giràldez) that the steady flow of silver into China—however it may have begun—owed its
persistence to the country’s size and huge demand for money. Of importance, while De Vries and Flynn
disagree about excess demand or excess supply, they clearly agree about long run disequilibrium. In my view,
though, De Vries’ position, emphasizing excess demand, or the Chinese demand pull on the world supply of
silver (much like a Bsuction pump,^ according to a frequent image), reflects the literature much better.
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in China (see Peng 1993–4, p. 768, and von Glahn 2016, Fig. 8.5, p. 332). The
price of rice is the usual index of the cost of living in China in the discussion. This
price rose by a multiple of about 2.5 in terms of silver during the period (see Peng
1993–4, pp. 601, 752, for 1680 to 1800; von Glahn 2003, Table 9.1, p. 191, for
1800 to 1820; and compare with Wang 1992, pp. 57–58). What about the earlier
period of 1550–1680/1700? To my mind, we need to split this period at least in
two parts: roughly 1550 to 1600 and 1600 to 1680 or 1700. For 1550–1600, the
idea of continuous pressure toward the appreciation of silver is reasonable and
cannot be ruled out. But for 1600–1700, it can.
From 1550 to 1600, the price of rice in terms of silver rose mildly (~15%), if at
all (Peng 1993–4, pp. 601, 768). Some deflationary pressure is within the margin
of error.16 In addition, an excess demand for silver should have raised the value of
silver in terms of bronze coins. Here the statistical information I have seen is
fragmentary (Vogel 1987, p. 17; von Glahn 1996a, pp. 106–107), but a rise in the
price of silver relative to coins seems possible, at least for the latter part of the
period, say, 1580–1600.
The difficulty regarding 1600–1700 is fairly evident. From 1600 to 1650, the
population fell by nearly 25% as a result of warfare, including civil war, and
the ultimate defeat of the Ming regime by the Xing in 1644.17 This fall in
population alone should have absorbed much, if not all, of any prior excess
stock-demand for silver. In addition, von Glahn (1996a, p. 207) refers to Bthe
catastrophic famine conditions of 1638-1642,^ Wang (1992, p. 66) describes the
draughts that hit China four years in a row in 1641–1644 as Bthe worst in the
last 500 years,^ and Marks (1997, pp. 147–51) refers to Bthe demographic crisis
of 1648-53.^ Because of the sharp fall in aggregate supply of goods, the price
of rice in terms of silver nearly doubled between 1620 and 1650 or thereabout,
with little or nothing to do with monetary circumstances and monetary policy
(and better viewed as stagflation rather than inflation). These same scarcity
conditions produced a fall in the demand for money for small transactions,
which led to a drop in the price of bronze coins by about half relative to silver.
Notwithstanding, the aggregate demand for silver held up: imports persisted and
even grew from 1626 to 1640. Evidently this rise in demand for silver cannot
be attributed to a desire to economize on transactions costs, but seems much
more likely to reflect a desire to move to safety. The economic situation then
reversed in agriculture in 1650–1660 to 1680–1700, or in the early decades of
the Xing dynasty, as population either stabilized or grew, and the price of rice
fell back close to its earlier levels in the first few decades of the seventeenth
century, while the price of bronze coins relative to silver (von Glahn 1996a,
16 Compare von Glahn 1996a, p. 159.
17 Some writers consider that sixteenth-century prosperity persisted in South China under the Mings until
1620 (e.g., Souza 1986, p. 17; Frank 1998, p. 160). Others see brewing problems in the 1590s (e.g., Goldstone
1991, p. 350). In dating the start of difficulties in 1600, I rely entirely on the population data from Liu and
Wang (1979), pp. 81–82, Table A1 (which is repeated by Maddison 1998, Table D.1, p. 169, and by von
Glahn (2003, Table 9.1, p. 191). This data shows a fairly steady 5% decline in population for China as a whole
in every decade starting with 1600 before the fall of the Mings in 1644, and no notable acceleration of the fall
in 1620. More recently, von Glahn (2016, Figure 8.3, p. 330) offers some new population data from two later
sources for the same general period (same general trend); however, one series starts in 1620 and the other in
1630.
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Fig. 11, p. 241) recovered heavily too.18 Imports of silver remained positive in
this time, but fell from earlier levels in 1650–1680. On the whole, it does not
seem plausible to ascribe the continuous inflow of silver in these tormented
years to an inability of stock-supply to catch up with ever-increasing stock-
demand for silver as a medium of exchange (not even if we add to this demand
the one for silver for sensory pleasure and social status). A flight to safety
seems much more apposite.
An alternative way of making sense of the imports of silver in the whole period
1550–1820 is to view the market for silver in China as close to equilibrium the entire
time but under different economic and political constraints, with some shifts in
tendencies as well as short-run periods of excess supply and excess demand. The
benefit of this mode of thinking is to avoid any sweeping idea of a continuous excess
demand for silver. The mode of reasoning also invites a closer look at the facts.
Consider first the 1680–1820 stretch (for which I have more information than
the 1700–1820 one). In this case there is only moderate difficulty in viewing the
steady inflow of silver as yielding steady equilibrium in the market for silver.
Wang (1992, pp. 64-65) estimates that silver stocks grew by .9 of 1 % annually in
this stretch while population grew by .72 of 1 %. Therefore, silver per capita grew
by .18 of 1 % annually. If we assume that per capita real output stayed the same, in
line with Maddison (1998), then silver rose by the same in relation to output. This
is consistent with some inflation. Yet, admittedly, inflation (measured on the basis
of the price of rice in terms of silver) went too far for this explanation alone to
suffice. Rice rose in price by a factor of 2.5 in these 140 years, corresponding to
an annual rise of around .66 of 1 %, far above .18. However, we should also bring
bronze coins into view. Once the Xing assumed full control of the country, as
mentioned earlier, they took a much more favorable attitude than the Ming toward
the minting of bronze coins as well as the monetary use of silver. To quote von
Glahn (2003, p. 200) for the eighteenth-century part of the period: B[The] emission
of bronze coins probably contributed more to the expansion of the money supply
than did imports of foreign silver.^ He goes on to estimate that the increase in
coins in silver-equivalents was nearly 50% higher than the imports of silver in
1740–1780. This would explain greater growth of the money supply than an
estimate based on silver alone. Further still, Wang (1979) stresses the growth of
private issues of cash notes (claims on coins) and silver notes in this time, though
primarily in the tail-end of the period, especially 1800–1820 (compare Elvin 1973,
pp. 293–4). Despite these added contributions to the money stock, however, all in
all, it would still be difficult to argue that the money stock rose as much 0.66 of 1
% annually relative to output in 1680–1820 (more than three times as much as the
rise in the silver component alone), and therefore the idea of a rough equilibrium
in the money stock in the period probably needs to be reinforced by the hypothesis
18 I find it confusing that the 1650–1680 period of higher agricultural output, stabilization of the population,
and falling agricultural prices is known in the literature as the BKangxi depression^ (granted the forcible
relocation of the coastal population to deprive the Ming loyalists in Taiwan of a source of supply). The
following quote from Wang (1992, p. 64) certainly gives a different impression: BAfter the establishment of
the Manchu rule in 1644, peace and order were gradually restored in the country. … The supply of grain
became plentiful relative to the demand for food, despite the cold climate that prevailed in the latter part of the
seventeenth century.^
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of some fall in the desired real stock of money per capita. Yet such a fall could be
plausibly attributed to a combination of three factors. First, output per capita
probably fell, contrary to Maddison (see especially Broadberry et al. 2017 and
also von Glahn 2016, pp. 350–9). Next, individual family size may have risen
with the rapid growth of population. Both would mean less demand for real
money per person. Last, the moderate development of finance (apart from the
cash and silver notes forming part of the money supply) meant more money
substitutes.
As regards the turbulent years 1600 to 1680 or 1700, I have already indicated the
need to admit a demand for silver as a refuge in times of distress and grave uncertainty.
This necessity holds both for the period of the shrinking of the economy in 1600–1650
and the early part of the recovery. In this connection, the sharp fall of the imports of
silver in the 1640–1680 part of the period (see Fig. 1) could be ascribed partly to
progressively lower growth in the safety demand for silver.
The years 1550–1600 offer perhaps the least challenge since they were mostly
peaceful, the population grew by around 10% and output roughly equally, while
prices hardly rose. A rise in the stock-demand could then well explain the
continuous inflows of silver. On the evidence, the inflows of silver might have
been just right to meet the demand at current prices. Notwithstanding, De Vries’
better-known view that the large inflows of silver in the period reflected a failure
of the stock-supply to keep up with the stock-demand cannot be dismissed out of
hand. This view probably fits better with the considerable rise in monetization of
China, in conjunction with the large size of the Chinese economy, at the time. Yet
the view implies steady deflation or upward pressure on the price of silver, which
is not easy to defend.
4 The Impact on China itself
We come to the interesting question of the theoretical effect of the continuous
inflow of silver on China itself. This question has so far been greatly
overshadowed in the literature by the subordinate one of the respective weights
of Europe and China in the outcome. A central feature of the recent scholarship on
the monetary history of China is rebellion against the Eurocentric view of world
monetary history that had prevailed only a few decades ago and that had treated
Europe as the fundamental motor of world monetary events. As an arch example
of this eurocentrism, Vilar’s much-admired study of precious metals in world
monetary history, Or et monnaie dans l’histoire (1974), devotes no more than 7
pages exclusively (112–19) to India, China and the Far East out of a total of 426.
The rest is predominantly about Europe, its sources of precious metals, and the
consequences for Europe itself. As another example, a more recent work titled The
history of Money, by Davis (2002), which reaches back to primitive moneys and
the birth of coinage in antiquity, contains only a sprinkling of references to China
and India and no separate section on Central and East Asia except for the
Westernization of Japan since 1878. The response of economic historians has
been vigorous. Some modern scholarship even attempts to place Chinese demand
for silver at the center of world monetary history in 1550–1820 (Flynn and
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Giràldez 1994, 1995b, pp. 217–8, 1996a, p. 311, 2002, pp. 419–20, Goldstone
1991, Frank 1998a). Unfortunately, one outstanding feature of this last literature is
a tendency to underplay the reciprocal effect of the inflow of silver on China
itself. As the argument goes, the income from the supply of silver to China made
Spain and Japan rich,19 and the inflows of precious metals from the New World
had a significant impact on money prices and economic activity in Europe, but
China was simply too big to be much affected by the inflows.20 My main concern
is with the use of monetary theory to defend this thesis. As noted in the introduc-
tion, the literature relies heavily on Bneutrality propositions,^ as they are known in
economics, about the strict nominal effects of the quantity of money on money
prices in the long run. Accordingly, though he would be among the first to
recognize the stimulating effect of the imports of silver on Chinese commercial
activity, von Glahn (1996a) declares in the early pages (pp. 3–4) of his towering
work: BThe presumption that massive imports of silver were a boon to the
[Chinese] economy finds little support in economic theory.^ It is clear, on close
inspection, that all such claims refer to the economic analysis of changes in the
quantity of money, and not the penetration of money exchange. Yet there is a
profound difference, in economic analysis, between a change in the quantity of
money in a monetized economy and a change in the monetization of an economy
affecting the extent of production for home consumption and barter trade. The
former does not alter the aggregate production function while the latter does.
Monetary theory devotes far more attention to the former, but the latter may well
be more relevant to the domestic impact of the inflows of silver into China.
To get the right perspective, let us suppose, to begin with, equilibrium in all
markets for goods including real money balances and then a doubling of the
nominal quantity of money and nothing else. In that case, apart from Bmoney
illusion,^ a doubling of all money prices (while all non-money nominal debt is
indexed to the general price level) would necessarily keep equilibrium the same.
Whether the economy will attain this new equilibrium or not and how, are major
questions in the history of economic thought that have remained a focus of
attention in economics right up to the present. Perhaps the outstanding conclusion
is that the economy will reach the equilibrium under the right assumptions. As
early as the mid-eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, Hume and Ricardo
had already carried this principle of the neutrality of money to extremes. The least
amount of precious metal will do as well as any other volume, they say; money
prices would simply need to be correspondingly lower (Hume [1752] in Rotwein
(1970), ed., pp. 47–59; Ricardo 1810). Decades later, John Stuart Mill intones:
BThere cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more insignificant thing, in the economy
of a society, than money^ (Mill 1848, p. 488). The traditional uses of the Fisher
equation, the Cambridge analysis of the demand for money, and the monetary
19 See Flynn (1991), who also argues, convincingly, that Spain misused its mineral wealth while Japan
exploited it well.
20 Frank takes an original position. He agrees that China profited greatly from the inflows of silver from the
NewWorld, but belittles the European contribution: BEurope was… far too weak and marginal to have much
impact on China^ (Frank 1998b). On his view, China was able to profit from the silver inflows because of its
high level of economic development and versatility. Europe, far more backward, could not cope with the
inflows of precious metals without succumbing to inflation (Frank 1998a, pp. 157–8, 353).
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approach to the balance payments are all in tune with this position. But among the
things that must stay constant in this reasoning is always the share of the economy
using money, or monetization as such.21 Otherwise a reduction in transaction costs
and costs of information would push the production possibility frontier of the
economy outward. Already in 1944, Postan (1944) devoted an entire paper to
alerting economic historians of the need to pay more attention to Bthe rise of a
money economy,^ as distinct from Bthe greater abundance of money itself^ (p.
129). More recently, in an extensive treatment of world financial structure since
1860, Goldsmith (1969, p.304) asserted: BThe proportion of the total goods and
services that is monetized, in the sense of being paid for in money by the
producer, is one of the most important characteristics of the level and course of
economic development. It should be of major concern to economic historians.^ In
economics, the sub-field of economic development is the main one to heed Postan
and Goldsmith. The standard reference is Chandavarkar (1977). Since the latter
wrote, the subject has tended to fuse with the broader issue of the impact of
finance on the growth of developing countries (for example, McLaughlin and
Kinoshita 2012), a fusion that Chandavarkar opposed. In monetary economics as
such, much of the interest in monetization has been the association with reductions
in information costs. A non-mathematical introduction with references to the
literature is Goodhart (1989, pp. 1-50). There is a related, more abstract, literature
on money as a coordination device (for numerous references, see Dubey et al.
2014)).
Once the issue is raised, the possible contribution of the flow of silver into China in
1550–1820 to monetization, and thereby its contribution to economic performance and
economic growth, is almost obvious. As of 1550, China had a long history of cash in
small transactions. However, apart from an impressive experiment with paper money in
the 13th and 14th centuries, which ended miserably after some notable success, the
country had a serious problem of money in large transactions. This problem clearly
interfered with the integration of the different parts of the country’s gigantic economy
and probably necessitated heavy reliance on production for own consumption, barter
transactions and tax payments in kind. In his highly condensed treatment of Chinese
economic history, Maddison (1998) poses a picture of an economy that is very efficient
in agriculture and land usage − far ahead of Europe in both regards even as late as 1820
− but hostile to manufacturing and commerce. This broad picture seems to fit in well
21 Of note, references to Bthe inconveniences of barter^ also have a venerable history in economic thought. A
quick way to see this is to look up the term in the subject index of Monroe’s (1923) work on monetary theory
before Adam Smith (Bbarter, inconveniences of^). Indeed, Hume’s essays, BOf Money^ and especially BOf
Interest^ [1752], can be read as much as an argument for the importance of monetization as for the
insignificance of the quantity of money. BLabour and industry gain life^ (Rotwein 1970, ed., p. 37), he thinks,
with the expansion of commerce, cities and manufacturing at the expense of agriculture and the landed
interests, which he associates largely with non-market activity. The former is the source of energy, innovation,
and saving; the latter the source of entrenched habit, consumption and debt. In the case of Smith (1776), apart
from early references to the disadvantages of barter, pp. 22–24, the relevant part of The Wealth of Nations is
the section discussing the local demand for silver in the New World, where he advances the view that before
the opening of the mines, Btheir [the Peruvians’] whole commerce was carried on by barter, and there was
accordingly scarce any division of labour among them^ (p. 203). Jevons (1875) has become perhaps the
standard historical reference on the inconveniences of barter (and much else about the benefits and desirable
characteristics of money), even though he thought that barter no longer mattered much in the world of his time
(p. 6)).
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with the general data on population, urbanization and agriculture. In 1550–1820,
China’s population grew by two and a half, if not more, while the European population
barely doubled. This accomplishment took place despite the fact that the country had
much less arable land per person than Europe did. The evidence is therefore consistent
with special strength in agriculture. On the other hand, Europe saw a much higher rate
of urbanization, as measured by population living in cities exceeding 10,000 (see De
Vries 1984 for Europe and Rozman 1973, 1990 for China). This next evidence would
seem to fit well with a lower development of manufacturing activities in China (even if
Chinese rural households did engage in some manufacturing activities that typically
took place in urban areas in Europe, such as textile spinning, weaving, and making
clothing). The exceptional population growth in China, especially in 1700–1820,
required a major shift of agricultural activities (begun centuries before) from the
production of Bsubsistence crops^ (which remained highly important), in terms of
development economics, to Bcash crops,^ like cotton, sugar, maize, peanuts, sweet
potatoes, tobacco and tea. This major turn to cash crops in the 1550–1820 period is also
well documented, as is the diversification of rural activities and growth in the number
of regular, organized markets in the countryside (see Skinner 1964–5; Perkins 1969;
Huang 1985; Marks 1997). All of this could only mean a shift to money trade. Cash
transactions with bronze coins alone might also not have sufficed. The likely contri-
bution of silver is clear. Payments in silver would have been useful not only in local
trade but also, and especially, in permitting the large interregional movements that sale
of the cash crops required. Silver would also have promoted the ability to specialize in
commerce and wholesale activities.
The 1700–1820 period may require a special word since bronze coins developed far
more than silver money at this time. Kuroda (2000) points to a deliberate effort by the
Xing to renounce seigniorage on the coins, or even to subsidize them, in order to
promote regional economic integration. Accordingly, the coins even began to serve in
large economic transactions despite the costs of transport. Von Glahn (1996a, p. 254;
2002, p. 59) refers to the use of coins in trade of land in 1750–1800. None of this sits
well with my previous (and conventional) distinction between coins and silver ingots
based on small and large denominations. Nevertheless, both Kuroda and von Glahn
agree that the silver money underlay interregional payments and provided much of the
glue for economic integration at the national level. Thus, for 1700–1820 as for the rest
of the 1550–1820 interval, it would be difficult to argue that monetization in China
could have evolved based on copper alone. Silver made an essential contribution too.
Peng (1993–4, pp. 570-1) and von Glahn (1996a, pp. 246-52; 1996b) point out
another possible connection between the inflows of silver into China and aggregate
economic performance. As mentioned earlier, the early Ming wanted to keep a strong
hand over the total stock of money, and thereby the rest of the economy, and for this
reason they fought the monetization of silver. Their eventual acceptance of silver
money therefore represented a victory of the commercial interests. It freed up
entrepreneurship and led to a more decentralized economy. Metzger (1979, p. 8) refers
to the emergence of a Bdynamism of the private sector^ in Ming-Xing times. This could
be a major added contribution, however difficult to assess.
In conclusion, I do not pretend to have shown that the inflow of silver raised
aggregate output in any part of the 1550–1820 stretch. This would require more work
and evidence (though, a priori, many specialists seem favorable to the idea (e.g.,
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Rozman 1973, p. 34; Atwell 1982, pp. 84–85; Marks 1997, pp. 193–4, 334–5). I do
claim that economic theory would support such a result and that the salient facts are
amenable to it.22
5 Conclusion
This paper takes issue with a number of prominent positions in the analysis of the flow
of silver into China in 1550–1820. The outstanding problem is the failure to recognize
the full significance of transaction costs. Because of these costs, arbitrage will only
explain why the exchange ratios between gold and silver in distant places will approach
a certain band. There is no market mechanism calling for equality of the exchange
ratios within the band. Wide geographical differences in silver/gold price ratios are far
better indications of high costs of arbitrage than opportunities for profitable arbitrage.
The only evidence of major arbitrage between gold and silver in trade with China in
1550–1750 was concentrated in two periods: around 1580–1630, and around 1700–
1750 (mainly 1720–1740). Only the 1720–1740 example clearly supports the idea that
the import of Chinese gold into Europe was important for European trade with China.
As other main points, the flow of silver rather than gold into China in the entire period
1550–1820 can be fundamentally interpreted as path dependence. Things could have
easily gone differently. The strict silver composition of the inflows is also only of
moderate significance for Chinese economic history in the period. In addition, the
sustained inflow of silver into China in 1550–1820 cannot be explained as a continuous
shortage of the metal. This explanation has its only possible merit in 1550–1600. A
better interpretation is to view the steady inflow as providing the extra supply of the
metal that was needed to keep the market in China at, or near, equilibrium under widely
varying conditions, all of which called for an increase in the metal, but not always for
the same reason. Finally, economic theory clearly admits the possibility that China
profited from the inflow of silver. The inflow could have had such an effect by
22 In their zeal to deny a Chinese advantage from the inflow of silver, Flynn and Giràldez (2000) claim that, if
anything, China lost from the inflow because the country gave up valuable resources in exchange for mere
money, a good that the country could have produced with paper at home. True, if the Chinese had mastered the
art of monetary control of paper money (without borrowing the paper abroad), they would have been spared a
lot of resources. But this is little relevant. Like the rest of the world, the Chinese had not learned the art, and in
these circumstances, Flynn and Giràldez’s view is difficult to defend. The Chinese merchants who bought the
silver from foreigners clearly benefited from the trade, as did the Chinese people who bought the imported
silver from the Chinese merchants. Any aggregate loss for China would depend on external diseconomies. But
one can hardly imagine what these diseconomies would be. On the other hand, the contribution of the
imported silver to Chinese aggregate wealth is easy to interpret: the imported silver represents a contribution to
the present discounted value of future economies in transactions costs (and future benefits of safety, esthetic
and other social satisfactions). True, the silver is no part of the productive capital at home, as the classical
economists emphasized, but it does enter in the parameters of the social welfare function by increasing the
outputs and utilities that result from given inputs (just as firm and household inventories of other goods do, by
smoothing production and consumption over time, avoiding interruptions, and in other ways related to
shopping and information costs). As a final note, this argument emphatically is not equivalent to mere
reference to the inflows of silver as Bincreasing market activity,^ Bgreasing the wheels of trade,^ and the like.
Such references are entirely compatible with strict short run effects on output that vanish after the adjustment
of prices (as Hume had explained nicely in 1752; see Rotwein, (1970), ed., pp. 38–40, 57–59).
Some Doubts about the Economic Analysis of the Flow of Silver to... 125
promoting the retreat from production for own consumption, the retreat from barter, the
integration of the national economy, and the independence of the private sector.
Appendix
Table 1 Estimated imports of silver into China 1550–1820 (annual values in metric tons)
Period Europea Japanb Total
1550–1600 19.28 25.6 44.88
1601–1605 29.5
1606–1610 43.2 24.8 68
1611–1615 31.2 51.8 83
1616–1620 19.8 51.3 71.1
1621–1625 57.3
1626–1630 11.6 40.3 51.9
1631–1635 18.3 68.9 87.2
1636–1640 15.4 99.2 114.6
1641–1645 7.9 41.8 49.7
1646–1650 4.3 33.3 37.6
1651–1655 2.1 43 45.1
1656–1660 1.2 59.3 60.4
1661–1665 1.1 65.1 66.2
1666–1670 0.7 15.8 16.5
1671–1675 0.4 20.8 21.2
1676–1680 1.5 23.2 24.7
1681–1685 2.6 23.2 25.8
1686–1690 5.9 2.7 8.6
1691–1695 6.8 2.7 9.5
1696–1700 14.7 2.7 17.4
1701–1705 7.5
1706–1710 6.6
1711–1718 4.1
1719–1725 15.2 6 21.2
1726–1733 24.5 6 30.5
1734–1740 25.7 2.5 28.2
1741–1748 35.9 1 36.9
1749–1755 56.6 1 57.6
1756–1762 32.8 1 33.8
1763–1769 72.3 1 73.3
1770–1777 47.4 1 48.4
1778–1784 33.1 1 34.1
1785–1791 91.3 1 92.3
1792–1798 42.9 1 43.9
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Table 1 (continued)
Period Europea Japanb Total
1799–1806 92.4 1 93.4
1807–1813 50.7 1 51.7
1814–1820 110.4 1 111.4
a The estimated imports of silver from Europe into China all come from von Glahn except for the last two
observations, which come Dermigny (1964), II, p. 735). They are all sums of inflows via the Philippines and
via the Indian Ocean. All the original data from von Glahn and Dermigny covered multiple-year intervals and
needed to be annualized. Thus, for the period 1550–1600, Glahn’s (1996a, Table 13, p. 140) figures for the
Philippines and the Indian Ocean were added and then divided by 50. For 1601–1700, von Glahn offers
quinquennial data (1996a, Table 23, p. 232) for the Philippines and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the two were
added and divided by 5. For 1719–1806, von Glahn (2003, Table 9.2, p. 195) offers annualized data for the
sums of the inflows covering 6- or 7-year stretches. The data were simply copied. Von Glahn’s data leaves
open two gaps for the study period 1550–1820, for 1701–1718 and for 1807–20. I was able to do nothing to
about the former, but I could cover the latter by going back to his source for 1719–1806, Dermigny (1964)
b For 1550–1700 the estimated imports of silver from Japan into China all come from the same Tables as those
in von Glahn (1996a) for the earlier imports from Europe. They posed the same need to annualize. For 1701–
1820, however, von Glahn offers no data. Therefore, I turned to Yamamura and Kamiki (1983), Table 7, p.
344, and used their preferred estimate, from Iwahashi (they offer one other). It was possible to check the
coherence of the Iwahashi figures from Yamamura and Kamiki with those from von Glahn because of an
overlap. Yamamura and Kamiki provide an Iwahashi estimate for 1601–1694, which could then be compared
with the quinquennial estimates von Glahn provides for the same years. The annualized values in both cases
are nearly identical. The only remaining problem then was to annualize the estimates that Yamamura and
Kamiki offer for 1695–1709, 1710–1713, 1714–35 and 1736–1817 and next to recalculate annual averages for
the same intervals that von Glahn offers for Europe
Table 2 Silver/gold exchange ratios ca. 1430–1850
Period Chinaa Germanyb Period Japanc Spanish Empired
1431 6 1447 4.04
1475 10.99
1480 11.56
1481 7
1483 11.68
1497 10.76 1497–1536 10.11
1501–1520 10.75
1502 9
1521–1540 11.25 1537–1565 10.61
1530 6 1540 3.62
1534 6.36 1566–1608 12.12
1541–1560 11.3 1571 7.37
1561–1580 11.5 1575 10.34
1568 6 1579 8.77
1572 8 1581 8.92
1581–1600 11.8 1583 9.19
1596 7.5 1588 9.15
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